INTAKE REVIEW · REVENUE LEAK INTELLIGENCE · EDITION ONE

The State of SaaS Revenue Leaks

An anatomy of where recurring revenue actually escapes — twenty-five leak frameworks in five families — and an audit of what the public benchmark literature can and cannot tell you about it. Every claim carries a label. Every number carries its sample size. And the things we cannot yet claim are printed as prominently as the things we can.

Edition One	25 frameworks	5 sources audited	0 proprietary rows
Published 11 August 2026	5 leak families	n stated for each	Stated, not hidden

SECTION 01

What this is, and what it is not

Most benchmark reports open by telling you how large their dataset is. This one opens by telling you what it does not have.

> **The honest position, printed first**
>
> **Intake Review has delivered zero client diagnostics to date.** Edition One therefore contains **no proprietary client data at all**. The free Revenue Leak Scorecard that feeds our intelligence layer went live in the same week this was published, so its corpus stands at zero rows on publication day. Nothing in this document is drawn from our own book of work, because there is not yet a book of work to draw from.

What Edition One *is*, then, is two things we can stand behind today:

One — the taxonomy. Twenty-five diagnostic frameworks, arranged in five families, that together describe the anatomy of revenue leakage in a B2B SaaS business. This is not a survey result. It is a structure, and a structure can be judged on its own merits: is anything missing, is anything double-counted, does it map to how the money actually moves. We publish it in full, including the exact question each framework asks.

Two — the audit. We took the public numbers a SaaS founder is most likely to be managing against, went to the primary sources rather than the summaries, and recorded for each one: the sample size, whether the metric's definition is published, and when the underlying survey was actually fielded. That audit produced a finding we did not expect, and it is the centrepiece of this edition.

The labelling contract

Every factual claim in this document carries one of four labels, and the label is not decoration — it tells you exactly how much weight the claim can bear.

LABEL	MEANS	YOU MAY
VERIFIED	Read by us from the primary source, with the source, date and sample size recorded	Quote it, with the n attached
CALCULATED	Arithmetic we performed on stated figures; the arithmetic is shown	Check our working, then quote it
ESTIMATE	A modelled coefficient chosen by us, not measured	Use it directionally. Never as a fact about your business
UNVERIFIED	Circulating publicly; we could not check it at the primary source	Treat with suspicion. We include it to show why

SECTION 02

Executive summary

Four findings. Two of them are about SaaS. Two of them are about the numbers people use to talk about SaaS.

FINDING 01

Median B2B SaaS net revenue retention is 82%, 101% and 102% — all at once VERIFIED

Three reputable sources, three answers, twenty points of spread on the single most-quoted metric in software. None of them is wrong. They are measuring different populations, and only some of them tell you which.

FINDING 02

The disclosure is usually there. It gets stripped in transit

CALCULATED

Four of the five sources we audited state their sample size, and three publish how they calculate the metric. The failure is not concealment at the source — it is that n and definition fall off the moment a number is repeated in a deck.

FINDING 03

About half of SaaS companies raise prices less often than once a year VERIFIED

28% every few years, 17% ad hoc, 4% never — 49% in total, against 29% who raise annually. On a survey of 310 companies. This is the most actionable public number we found.

FINDING 04

A report titled “2025” can rest on a survey fielded in early 2024

VERIFIED

Disclosed honestly inside the document, invisible by the time the number reaches a board pack. Benchmark vintage is a category of error nobody tracks.

The through-line

A revenue leak is not usually a mystery. It is a number nobody owns, measured a way nobody wrote down, compared against a benchmark nobody checked. The frameworks in Section 03 exist to give each leak an owner and a definition. The audit in Sections 09–11 exists to show why the benchmark half of that sentence is harder than it looks.

SECTION 03

The leak taxonomy — the category's anatomy

Twenty-five frameworks in five families. Each one asks a single question, and each question has a dollar answer. Click a family to isolate it.

26 **Pricing-model fit**

Keep per-seat, move to usage, or hybrid — and what does that do to revenue + the next raise?

PRICING & MONETIZATION

27 **Monetization / WTP gap**

How underpriced are you vs the value you deliver, and which packaging move closes the gap?

PRICING & MONETIZATION

30 **Gross-margin integrity**

Are gross margins SaaS-grade (75-80%+) or quietly eroding under inference / hosting costs?

PRICING & MONETIZATION

31 **Discounting discipline**

Is discounting a written policy or a panic reflex — and what margin does each point given away cost?

PRICING & MONETIZATION

32 **Multi-year contract mix**

What share of ARR is locked multi-year — and what would +10 points do to retention stability and valuation?

PRICING & MONETIZATION

28 **NRR & expansion**

Where exactly is NRR leaking — downsell, churn, or flat expansion — and what is the dollar repair?

RETENTION & EXPANSION

33 **GRR / logo churn**

What is gross retention before expansion masks it — and which segment is quietly bleeding logos?

RETENTION & EXPANSION

34 **Cohort gross retention**

Do this year's cohorts retain better or worse than last year's — and exactly where does the decay start?

RETENTION & EXPANSION

35 **Expansion playbook**

Is expansion a designed motion with triggers and owners — or an accident — and what NRR headroom is unworked?

RETENTION & EXPANSION

36 **Win-back rate**

What share of churned logos return — and is there a timed, priced win-back motion at all?

RETENTION & EXPANSION

37 **Acquisition CAC efficiency**

What does a new dollar of ARR cost by channel — and which channel is quietly underwater?

ACQUISITION & FUNNEL

38 **CAC payback**

How many months to recover CAC — inside or outside the 12-18 month bar your stage is judged on?

ACQUISITION & FUNNEL

39 **PLG funnel conversion**

Where does the self-serve funnel leak — signup, activation, or upgrade — in real percentages?

ACQUISITION & FUNNEL

40 **Sales-led conversion**

What converts from qualified pipeline to close, at what cycle length — and where do deals die?

ACQUISITION & FUNNEL

41 **Lead-source mix**

How concentrated is pipeline by source — and what happens to growth if the top source halves?

ACQUISITION & FUNNEL

42 **Time-to-value**

How long from signup to first real value — and what does every extra day cost in conversion?

ACTIVATION & CONVERSION

43 **Activation rate**

What share of signups reach the aha moment — and which step loses the most users?

ACTIVATION & CONVERSION

44 **Free-to-paid rate**

What share of free users ever pay — is the free tier a funnel or a parking lot?

ACTIVATION & CONVERSION

45 **Self-serve vs assisted**

Which motion closes which segment most efficiently — and where is sales effort subsidising deals self-serve should close?

ACTIVATION & CONVERSION

46 **Customer-success ratio**

How much ARR does each success owner defend vs benchmark — staffed to protect NRR or just to answer tickets?

ACTIVATION & CONVERSION

47 **Rule of 40**

Growth plus margin: where do you sit against the bar your next raise will be priced on?

CAPITAL EFFICIENCY & MOAT

48 **Magic Number**

How much new ARR does each sales-and-marketing dollar produce — efficient growth or bought revenue?

CAPITAL EFFICIENCY & MOAT

49 **Burn multiple**

How much cash burns per dollar of net-new ARR — and how fast does that close your funding window?

CAPITAL EFFICIENCY & MOAT

50 **Capital efficiency**

How much ARR per dollar raised versus peers — does your cap table read efficient or expensive?

CAPITAL EFFICIENCY & MOAT

29 **AI-defensibility moat**

Could one person + AI rebuild this in a weekend? The board / acquirer DD question.

CAPITAL EFFICIENCY & MOAT

Why five families and not seventeen

Revenue can only leak in five places: you charged too little for it (**Pricing & Monetization**), you won it and lost it (**Retention & Expansion**), you paid too much to find it (**Acquisition & Funnel**), you attracted it and never converted it (**Activation & Conversion**), or you burned the capital that bought it (**Capital Efficiency & Moat**). Every one of the twenty-five frameworks belongs to exactly one family, and the families are exhaustive by construction — five families, five frameworks each. If you can describe a revenue leak that does not fit one of these five, we want to hear about it, and Edition Two will carry it.

SECTION 04 · FINDING ONE

The 20-point question: what is median NRR?

Net revenue retention is the metric a SaaS board asks about first and a valuation is priced on. We asked three reputable sources what the median is. We got three different answers.

Green line marks 100% NRR — the point at which a company grows without adding a single new customer. Bars are medians as published by each source. VERIFIED each figure read from the primary source, 11 Aug 2026.

None of these sources is wrong. They are answering different questions.

The temptation is to pick the number you like and move on. The honest reading is that the gap is **mostly population, not contradiction**:

ChartMogul measures roughly 2,700 B2B companies drawn from businesses that connect their billing system to ChartMogul, with an inclusion floor of $250k ARR. That population contains a great many small, self-serve, low-ACV businesses. **SaaS Capital** surveys private B2B SaaS companies above **$1 million** ARR — a materially larger, more sales-led population.

And here is the evidence that population is the explanation rather than an excuse: **inside SaaS Capital's own data the same effect appears.** Median NRR climbs monotonically with deal size — **95%** at $0–10K ACV, **100%** at $10–25K, **102%** at $25–50K, **108%** at $50–100K, and **115%** above $100K. VERIFIED

MEDIAN NRR BY ACV BAND	$0–10K	$10–25K	$25–50K	$50–100K	$100K+
SaaS Capital 2025 · private B2B >$1M ARR	95%	100%	102%	108%	115%

A twenty-point spread between reports is therefore roughly the same size as the twenty-point spread *within one report* across deal sizes. Which means the practical conclusion is not "someone is lying".

The quartiles make it starker still

Compare the two populations at their edges rather than their middles. ChartMogul's **upper quartile** for B2B SaaS is **97%**. SaaS Capital's **lower quartile** at $25–50K ACV is also **97%**, against a top quartile of **111%**. VERIFIED

Read that again slowly: **a company in the top 25% of one dataset would sit in the bottom 25% of the other.** Same metric, same year, same three letters on the chart. If you have ever

been told your retention is strong, or weak, without being told which population you were being ranked inside, you now know how little that verdict was worth.

Two further figures from the same sources, for anyone sizing the AI question: ChartMogul puts AI-native NRR at **48%** — near B2C levels, far below B2B. VERIFIED And Benchmarkit reports gross revenue retention drifting down over three years, **90%** to **88%**, while median growth for usage-based-pricing companies ran **44%** against **25%** for traditional subscription. VERIFIED — though the publisher itself cautions that usage-based pricing correlates with AI-native companies, which can bias that comparison. We repeat the caution because they were right to make it.

So the practical conclusion is this:

> **The usable rule**
>
> **"Median SaaS NRR" is not a number you can manage against.** Median NRR *for companies of your ACV, measured your way* is. Before you take any retention benchmark into a board meeting, you need three things attached to it: the population, the ARR or ACV band, and the formula. If a benchmark does not travel with all three, it is decoration.

SECTION 05 · FINDING TWO

Who shows their working

We expected to find that benchmark publishers hide their samples. Mostly, they do not. We were wrong about where the failure happens.

SOURCE	SAMPLE SIZE STATED	DEFINITION PUBLISHED	SURVEY WINDOW STATED	HEADLINE WE TOOK
SaaS Capital 2025 Growth Rate Benchmarks	✅ **>1,000**	✅ Yes	✅ Q1 annually	**25% median growth**
SaaS Capital 2025 retention page	⚠️ Not on the page stated in the sibling PDF	✅ Full formula given	✅ Dec-23 → Dec-24	**102% NRR at $25–50K ACV**
ChartMogul The AI churn wave	✅ **3,500** (~2,700 B2B)	❌ Not published	✅ Through Sept 2025	**82% median B2B NRR**
Benchmarkit / Pavilion 2025 Performance Metrics	✅ **N = 563**	✅ Cohort method	✅ Feb–Mar 2024	**101% NRR**
SBI / Price Intelligently 2025 State of SaaS Pricing	✅ **N = 310**	✅ Yes	⚠️ Not clearly stated	**29% raise prices annually**
1Capture Free Trial Conversion Benchmarks 2025	⚠️ "10,000+" claimed	❌ None	❌ None	**18.5% trial-to-paid** UNV

Four of five primary reports state their sample size. Three publish their formula. CALCULATED — counted directly from the six rows above; the arithmetic is: n stated for SaaS Capital growth, ChartMogul, Benchmarkit and SBI; formula published by SaaS Capital retention, Benchmarkit and SBI.

So the folklore — that benchmark vendors bury their methods — is largely false, and we should say so plainly. The real failure mode is downstream. A number leaves a well-documented report with its n and its formula attached, gets quoted in a blog post without them, gets quoted again from the blog post, and arrives in a board pack as a bare figure with no ancestry at all.

The 1Capture row is the illustration, and we include it deliberately rather than to score a point. The page claims "10,000+ SaaS companies analyzed" and "2.5 million trial users tracked", and names four data sources. It publishes no sampling method, no time period, and no citable dataset. VERIFIED — we fetched the page on 11 Aug 2026 and searched it specifically for a methodology statement. That does not make its 18.5% figure false. It makes it **uncheckable**, which for a number you intend to run a company on is the same problem.

> **The test to apply to any benchmark, including ours**
> Can you name the population, the sample size, the formula and the date the data was collected? If any of the four is missing, you are not looking at a benchmark. You are looking at a rumour with a chart on it.

SECTION 06 · FINDING THREE

Pricing: the leak with the clearest evidence

Of everything we audited, this is the number with the best sourcing and the most direct operational consequence.

On a survey of **310** SaaS companies, price-increase frequency breaks down like this VERIFIED:

HOW OFTEN PRICES RISE	OVERALL	SMB	MIDMARKET	ENTERPRISE
Annually	29%	23%	32%	27%
At contract renewal	21%	16%	19%	25%
Every few years	28%	28%	29%	30%
Ad hoc	17%	28%	17%	11%
Never	4%	6%	2%	5%

49% of companies raise prices less often than once a year — 28% every few years, plus 17% ad hoc, plus 4% never. CALCULATED — 28 + 17 + 4 = 49, from the Overall column above.

The SMB column is the one to sit with. SMB-focused companies are **3× more likely than midmarket to never raise prices (6% vs 2%)** and **61% more likely to raise them ad hoc (28% vs 17%)**. VERIFIED — both comparisons are stated in the source, and both match the table above.

One more figure from the same survey, because it explains a great deal of unrealised pricing power: only **24%** of companies localise price based on willingness to pay. VERIFIED

> **Why this is the leak we model most confidently**
>
> Pricing is the only one of the five families where the *behaviour* is publicly measured with a stated n, even though the *dollar cost* of that behaviour is not. We know roughly half of companies let a year or more pass without a rise. We do not know, from any public source, what that costs them. That gap — measured behaviour, unmeasured consequence — is precisely the space a diagnostic occupies.

SECTION 07 · FINDING FOUR

What year is a benchmark from?

A quieter problem than the last three, and harder to spot once a number is loose in the world.

Benchmarkit's report is published and cited as the **2025** B2B SaaS Performance Metrics benchmarks. Inside the document, the survey window is disclosed clearly:

> *"Survey Date: Survey was open during February – March, 2024. We asked for either CY-24 data or last twelve months data."* VERIFIED

That is honest reporting, and the disclosure is exactly where it should be. The failure is not the publisher's. It is that the vintage does not survive the journey: by the time "101% NRR (2025)" reaches a strategy deck, the fact that it describes a market fielded in early 2024 has evaporated.

We also found, inside the same document, that the participant count is stated as **N = 563** in the participant profile and as **"n = 583 participants"** in two glossary footnotes, without reconciliation. VERIFIED We quote 563, because that is the figure attached to the participant profile itself. We flag it not as a gotcha — a twenty-respondent difference changes nothing material — but because a report that asks to be quoted precisely should be quoted precisely, and readers deserve to know we noticed.

SECTION 08

The IR4500 leak model, published in full

We publish our coefficients for the same reason we ask everyone else to: a model you cannot inspect is not a model, it is a claim.

The free scorecard scores four of the twenty-five frameworks from seven answers. Here is every coefficient it uses. All of them are **ESTIMATE** — **chosen by us, anchored to published behaviour, and not yet fitted to measured outcomes.**

TERM	FORMULA	STATUS
Retention (F13)	MRR × monthly churn × 12	**CALCULATED** — the visitor's own churn on their own MRR. No coefficient at all.
Pricing (F06)	ARR × uplift, where uplift = 2% (rise inside 6 months) rising to 13.5% (never), plus 4 points if pricing is a single flat price or has no clear structure	**ESTIMATE** — the recency ladder is shaped by the 49%-raise-less-than-annually finding above
Onboarding (F07)	ARR × (25% benchmark − your signup-to-paid band)	**ESTIMATE** — **our weakest assumption**, see below
Expansion (F14)	ARR × 2% (structured monthly motion) to 14% (nothing in place)	**ESTIMATE** — not calibrated against any measured sample
Total	Sum of the four, capped at 60% of ARR	The cap is a judgement: past 60% the model stops discriminating

The assumption we are least comfortable with

The onboarding term compares every company against a single **25% signup-to-paid benchmark** regardless of deal size. A $49/month self-serve product and a $5,000/month sales-led product plainly do not share one conversion bar. We use one anyway, today, because we do not have enough rows to split it by ACV — and the public conversion figures we could have borrowed are exactly the uncheckable kind described in Section 05. When the corpus can support an ACV split, this coefficient changes and we will say so in Edition Two, including what it was before.

Grade bands are equally arbitrary and equally published: leak below 10% of ARR is an **A**, 10–18% **B**, 18–28% **C**, 28–40% **D**, 40%+ **F**. They are judgement, not a distribution — because we do not yet have a distribution. Re-cutting them on real data is the first thing Edition Two owes you.

SECTION 09

What we will be able to claim, and when

Pre-registering a claim is the cheapest honesty there is: you write down what would have to be true before you would say it, before you have any incentive to bend it.

SCORECARD RUNS	NEEDED TO PUBLISH A MEDIAN	MEDIAN PUBLISHABLE

Corpus counter unavailable right now. The published figure stands at 0 rows.

CLAIM WE WANT TO MAKE	BLOCKED UNTIL	STATUS TODAY
"The median SaaS company leaks X% of ARR"	≥30 completed scorecard runs	❌ 0 rows
"Your leak is worse than X% of companies your size"	≥30 runs *within an ACV band*	❌ 0 rows
"Pricing is the largest leak family"	≥30 runs, reported with the spread, not just the mode	❌ 0 rows
"Our coefficients are calibrated"	Measured before/after outcomes from delivered diagnostics	❌ 0 delivered diagnostics
Case-study evidence from real engagements	The free-for-three deliveries complete	⏳ offers scheduled 12 Aug 2026

Three of those five unlock at the same threshold, and the threshold is deliberately unglamorous: thirty rows is not a research programme, it is the minimum at which a median stops being an anecdote. We would rather publish "n=31, here is the spread, treat it as directional" than wait for a number large enough to sound impressive and quietly skip the disclosure in the meantime.

> **Enforced, not promised**
> The public statistics endpoint behind the counter above returns the row count at any n, but **withholds every median and percentile until n ≥ 30**. Nobody has to remember the rule, and no future version of this page can quietly break it, because the data to break it with is not served.

SECTION 10

Score your own leak — five questions

A short version of the full scorecard, running entirely in this page. Nothing is sent anywhere and nothing is stored from this form.

Monthly Recurring Revenue, USD

28000

Monthly churn rate, %

3

Of every 100 signups, how many pay?

10 to 25

When did you last raise prices?

1 to 2 years ago

How do you grow revenue from existing customers?

Ad-hoc — when we remember

Show my leak grade →

C

25.5% of ARR is leaking

About $85,680 a year — $7,140 every month.

1	Pricing power F06 TOP 1	~$30,240/yr
2	Onboarding & activation F07 TOP 2	~$25,200/yr
3	Expansion revenue F14	~$20,160/yr
4	Retention F13	~$10,080/yr

Five questions cover four leak families with two coefficients defaulted. The full seven-question scorecard asks for your ARPU and pricing model as well, sizes the leak in customers rather than only dollars, and is the version that feeds the corpus above.

Run the full 7-question scorecard →

SECTION 11

Method appendix

Everything needed to check us, disagree with us, or reproduce this.

How the sources were gathered

Each source was located by public search, then **retrieved at the primary document** — the publisher's own page or PDF — on **11 August 2026**. Where a publisher offered a PDF, the PDF was downloaded and its text extracted locally rather than read through a summariser, specifically so that sample sizes and survey windows could be quoted verbatim. Two figures in our early drafting came from search-result summaries and were **corrected after primary retrieval contradicted them**; the corrected values are the ones printed here.

Full source register

SOURCE	N	POPULATION	DEFINITION	RETRIEVED
SaaS Capital — 2025 Private B2B SaaS Growth Rate Benchmarks	**>1,000**	Private B2B SaaS	Published	11 Aug 2026 · PDF, local text extraction
SaaS Capital — retention benchmarks page	**see above**	Private B2B SaaS >$1M ARR	Full formula published	11 Aug 2026 · page fetch
ChartMogul — The SaaS Retention Report: The AI churn wave	**3,500**	Software cos ≥$250k ARR, through Sept 2025	Not published	11 Aug 2026 · page fetch
Benchmarkit / Pavilion — 2025 B2B SaaS Performance Metrics	**563**	B2B SaaS; survey Feb–Mar 2024	Cohort method, published	11 Aug 2026 · PDF, local text extraction
SBI / Price Intelligently — 2025 State of SaaS Pricing	**310**	SaaS, SMB / midmarket / enterprise	Published	11 Aug 2026 · PDF, local text extraction
1Capture — Free Trial Conversion Benchmarks 2025	**“10,000+”**	Not specified	Not published	11 Aug 2026 · page fetch, methodology searched for

The exact NRR definitions, where published

SaaS Capital: “(Monthly Recurring Revenue in December of 2024 only from customers who were customers in December 2023) ÷ (Total MRR in December 2023)”. **Benchmarkit:** cohort method using ARR from the cohort of customers at the beginning of the period. **ChartMogul:** no definition published on the report page. That third entry is not an oversight on our part — we looked for it, and its absence is the finding.

What would falsify our findings

FINDING	WHAT WOULD PROVE IT WRONG
The NRR spread is population, not error	Showing the three sources produce different medians on the *same* population and ACV band
4 of 5 sources state n	Finding a stated sample size we missed — or that one we credited is not really stated. Our count is in the table in Section 05; check it
49% raise less often than annually	A larger, better-sampled pricing survey with a different distribution
Our leak coefficients	Measured outcomes from real engagements. We have none. This is the weakest part of the document and we would rather you knew

Conflicts of interest

Intake Review sells revenue diagnostics. A document arguing that revenue leaks are large, poorly measured and worth diagnosing is **directly commercially convenient for us**. You should apply the same test to Section 08 that we applied to everyone else in Section 05: the coefficients are published, so check whether they are flattering to our own product. We think they are conservative. You are better placed than we are to judge whether we managed it.

SECTION 12

Claim register

Every substantive claim in this edition, with its label. Filter it.

CLAIM	LABEL	BASIS
Median B2B SaaS NRR is reported as 82% (ChartMogul, n≈2,700 B2B)	VERIFIED	Primary source, retrieved 11 Aug 2026
Median NRR is reported as 101% (Benchmarkit, N=563)	VERIFIED	Primary PDF, text extracted locally
Median NRR at $25–50K ACV is 102% (SaaS Capital, n>1,000)	VERIFIED	Publisher page, retrieved 11 Aug 2026
SaaS Capital median NRR rises 95% → 115% across ACV bands	VERIFIED	Publisher page; five bands quoted in Section 04
ChartMogul's upper quartile (97%) equals SaaS Capital's lower quartile at $25–50K ACV	VERIFIED	Both figures read from their primary sources; the comparison is ours
SaaS Capital top quartile at $25–50K ACV is 111%	VERIFIED	Publisher page, retrieved 11 Aug 2026
AI-native NRR is 48% (ChartMogul)	VERIFIED	Primary source; n≈200 AI-native companies
Gross revenue retention drifted 90% → 88% over three years	VERIFIED	Benchmarkit primary PDF
Usage-based pricing companies grew 44% vs 25% for traditional subscription	VERIFIED	Benchmarkit primary PDF; publisher's own bias caution repeated
SaaS Capital 2025 survey had >1,000 respondents	VERIFIED	Quoted verbatim from the publisher PDF
Median growth rate for all companies in that survey was 25%	VERIFIED	Quoted verbatim from the publisher PDF
4 of 5 primary sources state their sample size; 3 publish their formula	CALCULATED	Counted from the register in Section 05
49% of SaaS companies raise prices less often than annually	CALCULATED	28 + 17 + 4 from the SBI table, N=310
29% raise prices annually (N=310)	VERIFIED	SBI / Price Intelligently, primary PDF
SMBs are 3× more likely than midmarket to never raise prices (6% vs 2%)	VERIFIED	Stated in source and consistent with its own table
Only 24% localise price based on willingness to pay	VERIFIED	SBI / Price Intelligently, primary PDF
Benchmarkit's 2025 report is based on a survey fielded Feb–Mar 2024	VERIFIED	Quoted verbatim from the document's glossary
Benchmarkit states N=563 in its profile and n=583 in two footnotes	VERIFIED	Both figures found in the extracted PDF text
1Capture publishes no methodology for its '10,000+ companies' claim	VERIFIED	Page fetched and searched specifically for a method statement
Median trial-to-paid conversion is 18.5%	UNVERIFIED	Widely circulated; no checkable method found. Not relied on
IR4500 leak coefficients for pricing, onboarding and expansion	ESTIMATE	Chosen by us and published in Section 08. Not fitted to data

CLAIM	LABEL	BASIS
Grade bands (A <10%, B 10–18%, C 18–28%, D 28–40%, F 40%+)	ESTIMATE	Judgement. No distribution exists to cut them on yet
Intake Review has delivered 0 client diagnostics to date	VERIFIED	Client and report directories both empty on 11 Aug 2026
The scorecard corpus stands at 0 rows on publication day	VERIFIED	The intelligence layer went live the same week

SECTION 13

Colophon

The State of SaaS Revenue Leaks — Edition One. Published 11 August 2026 by Intake Review, part of Alvi Ventures. Compiled from public sources retrieved at primary on the publication date, and from a leak taxonomy of twenty-five frameworks maintained by Intake Review.

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Corrections. If a number here is wrong, we want to know more than we want to be right — a report that audits other people's disclosure has no business being precious about its own. Write to hello@intakereview4500.com and corrections will be published in Edition Two with the original value shown alongside.

Edition Two will carry: the first scorecard corpus statistics with n stated, re-cut grade bands if the distribution warrants it, findings from the first delivered diagnostics, and any coefficient we were forced to change — including what it used to be.

Offline copy. The PDF twin is printed from this same page, so the two cannot disagree: THE-STATE-OF-SAAS-REVENUE-LEAKS-EDITION-ONE.pdf (18 pages).

Download the PDF ↓ | Run the free scorecard → | See the full diagnostic →

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100% async · no calls · no meetings. Every claim in this document carries a label and a sample size, or it does not appear.